Ahtract -We model the process of communicating in the presence of interference, which is unknown or hostile, as a two-person zerwsum game with the communicator and the jammer as the players. The objective function we consider is the rate of reliable communication. The communicator's strategies are encoders and distributions on a set of quantizers. The jammer's strategies are distributions on the noise power subject to certain constraints. We consider various conditions on the jammer's strategy set and on the communicator's knowledge. For the case where the decoder is uninformed of the actual quantizer chosen we show that, from the communicator's perspective, the worst-case jamming strategy is a distribution concentrated on a finite number of points, thereby converting a functional optimization problem into a nonlinear programming problem. Moreover we are able to characterize the worst-case distributions by means of necessary and sufficient conditions which are easy to verify. For the case where the decoder is informed of the actual quantizer chosen we are able to demonstrate the existence of saddle-point strategies. The analysip is also seen to be valid for a number of situations where the jammer is adaptive.
additive white Gaussian noise is identical to the performance of nonspread systems; namely, the bit error probability decreases exponentially with the signal-to-noise ratio. However, when subject to worst-case partial-band or pulsed jamming (wherein power is concentrated in time or frequency to affect only a fraction of the symbols transmitted while allowing the remaining to be received "errorfree") the bit error probability of a spread-spectrum system decreases only inverse linearly with the signal-to-noise ratio. This is a significant degradation, typically on the order of 30-40 dB compared to an additive white Gaussian noise channel for a bit error probability on the order of lop5.
To remedy this situation, most systems use some form of error-correction coding. As has been well-known in the communication field, hard-decision decoding requires roughly a 2-dB larger signal-to-noise ratio than soft-decision decoding for the same error probability. Thus considerable interest has focused on soft-decision decoding. One problem that has been observed is that if a (soft) decoding algorithm designed for a nonjammed channel is used for a jammed channel, then the performance is extremely poor when the jamming strategy is optimized. One method for "overcoming" this difficulty is to assume the jamming noise has one of two distributions (usually one having zero variance called the "off" state and the other called the "on" state) and that the decoder knows when the jammer is ''on'' and when the jammer is "off." Most systems analyses do not incorporate jamming strategies that affect the reliability of the side information (see, however, [24] ).
Thus there is considerable interest in decoding algorithms that do not assume side information and do not do hard-decision decoding. However, most of these algorithms still assume the jammer pulses between one of two levels. In this paper we investigate the case of a decoder that processes symbols from a finite alphabet (i.e., multilevel quantization) and where the only constraints on the jammer are average and peak power. We formulate the problem as a game with two players. The jammer, whose strategy set consists of distributions on the power of the jamming noise, and the communicator, whose strategy set consists of encoders and distributions on the set of quantizers. The objective function is the rate of reliable communication, with the communicator wishing to maximize the rate and the jammer seeking to minimize the rate. We first 0018-9448/89/0700-0770$01.00 01989 IEEE show that this game is equivalent to a game with mutual information as the objective function and the communicator's strategies replaced by distributions on the input to the channel and distributions on the quantizer selected. We look for worst-case jamming strategies and investigate when the game admits a saddle point. Other work done on an information-theoretic modeling of spread-spectrum systems subject to jamming can be found in . These papers, however, do not consider multilevel jamming and soft-decision decoding, both of which are considered in this paper.
We now describe the basic setup of our problem and assumptions. After the model is described we will explain how the model applies to a frequency-hopped spread-spectrum communication system. We consider a modulator that transmits one out of M symbols. T h s transmitted symbol is denoted by the random variable X. The received signal which has been corrupted by the jammer in some fashion is demodulated and quantized into one of L values. To forbid the jammer from using knowledge of the quantizer in designing his worst-case strategy, we allow randomization of the quantizer over some given set of quantizers. Clearly, such randomization increases the size of the communicator's strategy set. Thus we view this situation as a game with two players: the jammer and the communicator. The jammer selects the noise power in the channel, and the communicator chooses the encoder, the decoder, and the quantizer. The jammer can be thought of as modulating a generic noise variable by varying the power according to some distribution. The strategy set for the jammer is the set of all distributions on the power of the jamming noise subject to the given constraints on the peak and average power.
We assume that the jamming strategy, while fixed for a whole codeword, is to choose independently the noise power in the channel from symbol to symbol. There are several reasons for using this model. First, since we are examining the performance of very long codes, we will not, for example, let the jammer pulse on for a whole codeword and then off for a whole codeword or equivalently jam the whole frequency band for a whole codeword. Second, a strategy that is used in many coded systems is interleaving. This, in effect, makes each of the encoders/decoders see a memoryless channel. Third, but not of lesser importance, since the point of the paper is to examine the multilevel jamming strategies and multilevel quantization strategies, we do not complicate the problem by including a jammer with memory.
The strategy set for the communicator is the set of (block) encoders and decoders and distributions on quantizers. Let us denote by E a particular choice of encoder, decoder, and quantizer distribution, and let X denote the input of the channel. Furthermore, let P denote a distribution on the input alphabet, G a distribution on the set of quantizers, F a distribution on the noise power chosen by the jammer, Y a random variable denoting the output of the quantizer, and I ( G , P; F ) the mutual information, I (X, Y ) , between X and Y under the choice of F, P , and G. The payoff we are interested in analyzing is the rate of reliable communication ( R say) in this situation. The communicator wants to maximize it, and the jammer wants to minimize it. Thus the lower and the upper value of this game would be maxE min. R ( E , F ) , and min, maxE R( E , F ) , respectively.
Consider the upper value of the game, min. maxE R( E , F ) . From the channel coding theorem [8, theorem 1.5, p. 1041 we see that for each choice of F, max. F ) is max.,. Z(G, P; F ) , and so the upper value of the game is min, rnaxG,. Z(G, P ; F ) . Now consider the lower value of the game, maxE min R ( E , F ) . From the compound channel coding theorem [8, corollary 5.10, p. 1731 we see that this lower value is maxp,G min. Z(G, P; F ) .
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As a consequence of these observations, we recognize that we may equivalently view the situation as a two-person zero-sum game with the communicator and jammer as players, with the jammer's strategy set being the set of distributions F (subject to some constraint), the communicator's strategy set being the set of distributions ( P , G ) , and with the mutual information Z(G, P ; F ) being the payoff or objective function.
Our basic model can be easily seen to fit a frequency-hop communication system in which the modulation uses an M-ary signal set, using say D dimensions where D I M (see the example in Section 11). The spread-spectrum bandwidth is divided into a large number of frequency slots. There are several ways that one can hop the modulated signal. One possibility is to have all of the M possible signals use the same pseudorandom hopping pattern. In this case the particular frequency slot used is independent of the data transmitted. Another possibility is to have M frequency hopping patterns, one for each data symbol. In this case the frequency slot used depends on which of the M data symbols is transmitted. The jammer can distribute his total power in any fashion over the whole set of frequency slots. However, the distribution the jammer chooses remains the same for the duration of the codeword. In the first type of hopping system the jammer may be able to add noise in either all or none of the signal dimensions. In the second case the appropriate model is for the noise added in each dimension to be independent. We will say more about these two cases when the model is described mathematically in Section 11.
We now summarize the results obtained in this paper. For the general setup just described we show that the worst-case jamming strategy from the communicator's perspective is to pulse between a finite number of power levels. We also consider the case of random quantizing strategies where the demodulator output is quantized into a finite number of outputs by a randomized quantizer, i.e., the quantization thresholds are random. For the case of randomized quantizer thresholds we show that the optimal randomized quantizer can perform better than the nonrandomized quantizer and that from the jammer's point of view the worst-case distribution of the quantizer thresholds is concentrated on a finite number of points.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section I1 we define the models we will be considering and give examples for which our models apply. In Sections I11 and IV we derive results concerning the worst-case jamming strategy and the optimal quantizer strategy for the cases where the decoder is uninformed about the actual quantizer chosen and informed about the actual quantizer chosen, respectively. Finally, in Section V we discuss our results and state our conclusions and extensions.
CHANNEL MODELS
In this section we describe the models we use in the subsequent analysis. In all cases we consider a modulator that transmits one out of M signals in D dimensions ( D I M ) . This transmitted signal is denoted by the random variable X. The received signal which is corrupted by the jammer in some fashion is demodulated and quantized into one of L values. The received signal is denoted by the random variable Y .
The general philosophy that we will use is that of game theory with the players being the jammer and the commu- N is a zero-mean unit-variance Gaussian random variable, then the jammer's noise may be of the form Z,N. We note here that the distribution of the generic random variable N is not important (except for the constraints on the mean and variance), and all the results hold for any such random variable. The jammer has an average-power constraint and a peak-power constraint. More generally, the jammer is constrained by ~f~~, , z , ,~~~, z ,~d~( z , , z , ,~~~,~, ) 
and
where b, is the peak-power constraint and f( z,,. . . , z,) is some continuous functional of ( z,,. . . , z,) . For average power constrained channels with no peak constraint we let 6, become very large. The output of the demodulator is quantized into one of L values, say 0,1,.. e, L -1. The output of the quantizer, Y, is also the output of the channel for coding. Before proceeding, we illustrate this model with an example. Consider a frequency-hop communication system. The modulated signal is one of two orthogonal tones, i.e., binary frequency shift keying (D = M = 2). X = 0 corresponds to transmitting a tone in the first and X = 1 to transmitting a tone in the second dimension. Before transmission the modulated signal is hopped over a set of 4 distinct frequencies. The signal is affected by a jammer with constraints on the total power and peak power. The jammer may distribute the total available power in any manner over the set of q frequency slots (subject to the constraints to be mentioned later). Let Wl, , be the (random) amount of jamming power in the ith frequency slot and j t h signal dimension i = 1,. . a , q and j = 1,2. The actual noise in the ith frequency slot and j t h dimension is N,W,,, where N, is the generic (unit variance) noise random variable in dimension j . The received signal is the sum of the transmitted signal and the jamming signal. The frequency dehopper (which is synchronized to the transmitted hopping pattern) dehops the received signal, i.e., selects the appropriate hopping frequency slot for demodulation. Thus the output of the frequency dehopper is the modulated signal plus the jamming noise at the frequency slot chosen by the hopping pattern. Since the frequency hopper chooses each of the q frequency slots with probability l/q, the noise power in dimension j at the input to the demodulator is Wl,J with probability l/q for i = 1,-. a , 4 and j = 1,2. Thus Z, = Wl, , with probability l/q. Thus by integrating the conditional distribution of the random variables R , and R , over the regions just defined we can determine the conditional probability transition z,, z,) and 8. The interpretation of the quantizer is the following. Y = 0 represents a transmitted symbol 0 received with high quality, whereas Y = 1 represents a transmitted symbol 0 with low quality, etc. The quantizer is parameterized by 8 which is between 0 and 1 (see Viterbi [26] ). Examples for other types of quantizers and modulators are easy to find.
The strategies for the communicator are to choose a distribution dG(f3) on 0, the random quantization thresholds and a distribution, d P ( x ) on the input alphabet. We will let Q be the parameter space for the quantizers and assume Q is some compact subset of R . For each ( z,,. . . , z D ) and 8 E Q there is a probability distribution on the output of the channel given the input of the channel:
Pr{ Y = y l x = x , 0 = 8 , Z,=z,, Z , = z 2 ; .., Z , = z D } = p ( y I x , 8 ,~, , z * , . . . , z g ) . (3) The foregoing model describes the input/output relation of the channel for a particular symbol. In addition, we model the channel as being memoryless. We now introduce some notation. Let
quantizer parameter space (some compact subset of R ) , p ( ylx, 8, z ) transition probability from x to y given 8, z ,
Z
=(Z1;-.,Z,), O I Z , I b , ,
Let S denote the set of all probability distributions on the Bore1 sets of K A ( Z = ( Z~;~~, Z~) :~I Z~I~, } .
The mutual information between X and Y when they are related by the stochastic matrix PYIx(G, F ) is
where The performance measure we are interested in is the largest rate such that nearly error-free communication can be achieved, i.e., channel capacity. Another performance measure of interest is the channel cut-off rate R , (many researchers [15] believe thts to be a practical limit to the set of rates for which reliable communication is possible). Similar results to those in this paper can be derived with R , as the performance measure (see [13]). We consider two different information structures for the communicator:
I) The decoder is unaware of the actual quantizer chosen but only knows the distribution d G ( 8 ) on the set of quantizers. The jammer knows only the set of quantizers but not the distribution d G ( 8 ) chosen by the communicator. He is also aware of the fact that the decoder does not know the actual quantizer chosen.
11) The decoder knows the actual quantizer chosen. Again, the jammer knows only the set of quantizers. He also knows that the decoder is aware of the actual quantizer chosen.
Case I is seen to apply to situations where, possibly for implementation reasons, the decoding is fixed and not altered with the specific quantizer chosen. It may also be viewed as worst case in the sense that the decoder's knowledge of the specific quantizer and the utilization of such knowledge can only improve the communicator's performance. When there is no randomization of the quantizer, i.e., the quantizer is fixed, Cases I and I1 are the same and our results for both cases apply.
Several special jamming strategies are of interest because of their correspondence to physical problems. We will classify the cases as follows: 
Communicator's Perspective
The communicator is interested in the maximum rate at which information can be reliably transmitted no matter what strategy the jammer employs. The communicator designs his system assuming the jammer will somehow find out the strategy he is using and then choose the worst possible distribution on the power levels. The largest such rate is max min Z(G, P ; F )
G . P F
where Z(G, P ; F ) A Z ( X Y ) and (dG, d P ) is chosen by the communicator and dF is chosen-by the jammer. That this is the maximum rate of reliable transmission is well-known since what we are dealing with is a compound channel with a finite input alphabet and a finite output alphabet [8, pp. 172-1731.
Jammer's Perspective
The jammer is interested in finding the minimum value of the rate so that information cannot be reliably transmitted at any higher rate no matter what strategy the communicator employs. The jammer designs his system assuming the communicator will somehow find out the strategy he is using and then design the optimal communication system. The jammer attempts to minimize the rate above which reliable communication cannot occur. The smallest such rate is min max I ( G , P ; F ) .
That this is the smallest rate the jammer can guarantee is obvious because for each F the rate above which reliable communication is impossible is max,,, d P I( G, P; F ) .
dF d G . d P
In Case I, no simplification of the mutual information occurs. However, in Case I1 the appropriate mutual information can be written as an expectation of the mutual information for a fixed 8:
where EG refers to taking expectations with respect to dG and I ( @ , P ; F ) A Z ( X YlO).
In all of our analysis we assume that the jammer and the decoder/quantizer have complete information about the set of strategies available to each one of these so that no secret information is considered. As mentioned previously, the performance measure we consider is the largest rate such that reliable communication (in the sense of arbitrarily small error probability) is possible.
We are now ready to state the results. In brief, our results show that when the decoder is informed of the quantization rule, then (under a compatibility assumption) there is a saddle-point in Cases A and B, i.e., the jammer's rate and the communicator's rate are equal (Theorem 5). However, when the decoder is not informed of the quantization rule, then the jammer's rate and the communicator's rate may differ. The optimal distributions F from the communicator's point of view and the G from the jammer's point of view are finite dimensional (in all the Cases A,B,C, and D) (Theorem 1). This converts a functional optimization problem into a finite-dimensional nonlinear programming problem.
CASE AI: DECODER UNINFORMED
The communicator has to determine the distributions ( d G ( e), d P ( x ) ) that maximize the amount of information Z(G, P ; F ) transmitted. The jammer has to find the noise distribution dF( z ) to minimize the information received by the decoder. Thus the communicator's goal is to achieve
whereas the jammer wants to achieve min max I ( G , P ; F ) .
d~( 2 ) m e ), dp( =)
In this section we show that for any choice of strategy by either player there is a simple characterization of the optimal reaction strategy of his opponent.
Theorem 1: a) The jammer can achieve the minimum in maxdG(o),dp(x) mind,(,, I ( G , P ; F ) with a distribution con-
b) The communicator can achieve the maximum in mindqz) maxdG(e),dP(x) Z(G, P; F ) with a distribution concentrated at at most M ( L -1) + 1 points.
Discussion: Theorem la) says that the communicator in trying to achieve rnax,,(,), d P ! x ) mindqZ) I ( G , P ; F ) has to consider only reaction strategies of the jammer that have a finite number of points of support, i.e., for each ( d G ( e), dP( x)) chosen by the communicator the worst-case jammer distribution may be assumed to be concentrated at a finite number of points and this number is bounded uniformly (in (dG( e), d P ( x ) ) ) by M ( L -1) + 2. It follows that for a fixed quantizer (i.e., no randomization of the quantization) the worst-case jammer is one who chooses such a finite-dimensional distribution. Similarly, Theorem lb) says that the jammer may, in trying to achieve mind,(,, maxdGco,, dp(x)Z( G , P ; F ) , consider only finitedimensional reaction strategies on the communicator's part.
To prove these results, we use the following facts: 1) the convexity and concavity properties of the mutual information function (it is convex in the channel transition matrix and concave in the input distribution), 2) the equivalence of weak convergence with Levy convergence in our situation [13] , a fact which we use to show the continuity of our objective function in the strategies as well as compactness of our strategy sets (this allows us to conclude that there is a worst-case jamming strategy and a best-case communicator strategy), and 3) Dubins' theorem to demonstrate that the optimal reaction strategies are described by distributions concentrated on a finite number of points. Dubins' theorem allows the extreme points of certain convex sets to be written as finite linear combinations of extreme points of larger convex sets. for any fixed (dG( e), dP( x ) ) .
Let S A set of all probability distributions on the Bore1 subsets of K , and
( be a hyperplane in S.
in S'.
Lemma 2: Z(G, P; F ) achieves its maximum (minimum)
Proof: We note that S is compact in the Levy topology The lemmas are now used to complete the proof of Theorem 1. From Lemma 2 we know that Z(G, P ; F ) achieves its minimum in S'. Denote the corresponding Furthermore, S is convex; S is linearly bounded (S being compact in a metric space is bounded, and hence its intersection with any line is bounded), and S being a compact subset of a metric space is closed and any line 1 in the metric space is closed. Thus S is also linearly closed. Hence we have that S is a convex, linearly closed, and linearly bounded set. By Dubins' theorem [lo] we can conclude that since A is the intersection of S with M( L -1) + 1 hyperplanes, every extreme point of A is a convex combination of M( L -1) + 2 or fewer points of S.
From our construction of A we know that Z(G, P; F ) is constant on A. Hence for fixed (dG(B), d P ( x ) ) , Z(G, P ; F ) assumes its minimum value at an extreme point of A also.
Hence Z(G, P ; F ) assumes its minimum value at some point dF( z ) which is a convex combination of M( L -1) + 2 or fewer extreme points of S.
Since the extreme points of S are the one-point distributions, we can finally assert that for each ( d G ( B ) , d P ( x ) ) the jammer can achieve the minimum in max min I(G, P ; F )
This concludes the proof of a).
For channels that are symmetric for each 8 and z , i.e., For b) we note that the jammer wants to achieve min max I ( G , P ; F ) .
d F ( z ) dG(B),dP(x)
T h s may be written as
where C(G, F ) A maxdP(x)Z(G, P; F ) .
We note that, as in Lemma 1, for any fixed 
A. Necessary and Suflicient Conditions
We now characterize the aforementioned finitedimensional distributions by means of necessary and sufficient conditions. We first briefly introduce the appropriate definitions and results from optimization theory and then specialize them to our cases.
Let !d be a convex set and f a function from !d into R .
For some fixed xo, if for all x lim (9) f ( ( l -a ) x o + Q I X ) -f f ( X * )
LO a exists, f is said to be weakly differentiable at x o and the foregoing limit is denoted by f,l,(x), the weak derivative at x,. I f f is weakly differentiable in Q at x, for all x, in 0, f is said to be weakly differentiable in Q. We now state an optimization theorem that follows from [14, p. 1781.
Optimization Theorem: Let f be a continuous weakly differentiable concave map from a compact convex set to R . Let
C A sup f ( x ) .
(10)
for some x, E 0; 2) a necessary and sufficient condition for f(xo) = C is f i 0 ( x ) I 0 for all x E Q .
Constrained Optimization Theorem [14, p . 21 71: Let 0 be a convex subset of a linear vector space and f and g concave functionals on 0 to R . Assume there is an x1 E 0 such that g(xl) < 0, and let
C'Z sup f ( x ) .
(11)
If C' is finite, then there exists a constant h 2 0 such that 
( G , K J ) = SUP [ -Z ( G , P ; F ) -X D ( F ) ] . (14)
F E S We now formulate necessary and sufficient conditions for the characterization of the optimal distributions of Theorem 1 in the following two theorems.
Theorem 2: U,(G, K J ) is achieved by a distribution F, E S satisfying D( F )
0 and a necessary and sufficient condition for U,(G, K J ) = -I ( G , P ; F,) is that for some constant X 2 0
/ K [ -i ( z ; G , F o ) -h f ( z ) ] d F ( z )~-Z ( G , P ; F , ) -X K ,
for all F E S where ? " I X ( G , a F , + ( 1 -a ) F 2 ) ) 1 = I ( /JQP ( A x , 8 , z ) d G ( 8 ) (adF1 + (1 -a) dF2)   = Z ( a ? v l x ( G ; F 1 ) + ( l -a ) F y l x ( G ; F2) From Theorem 1 we know that it is possible to find F, from the set of distributions with a €inite number of points of support. Finding such an Fo entails determining the set of points of increase as well as the amounts of increase of F, at those points. Let E, denote the set of points of increase of F,. We now show the following. 
C1) -i ( z ; G , F , ) I -I ( G , P ; F , ) + X ( f ( z ) -K , )
, and for all z E K for all z E E,.
Proof: Sufficiency is clear because if both conditions 1) and 2) hold, then the conditions of Theorem 2 hold. We show necessity.
Assume that F, is "optimal," but C1 is not true. Then there must exist some z,
. Let Fl( z ) be a probability distribution with a unit increase at such a point zl E K. Then 
B. The Remaining Cases
Case BZ: With F ( z ) now recognized as a one-dimensional distribution, Theorems 1 and 2 are easily seen to be true. (19) which contradicts Theorem 2. Hence C1 must be true. Now assume that F, is "optimal," but C2 is not true. Then since C1 is true, 
i ( z ; G , F o ) = Z ( G , P ; F , ) + X ( f ( z ) -K , )
and we have
i.e., a contradiction. Hence C2 must be true. 
By our previous arguments each L, is
with a distribution dr;] concentrated at no more than
Since i is arbitrary, we can assert that the jammer can achieve the minimum in (16) are easily seen to be true as stated. (22) IV. CASE AII: DECODER INFORMED Theorems 1 and 3 reduce the calculation of the distributions describing the reaction strategies to finite-dimensional nonlinear programming problems. They can be used to simplify the search for conservative strategies which are optimal for either player. In Theorem 4 we assert the existence of conservative strategies for each player.
We have an arbitrary joint distribution on Z,; . e , Z,.
The jammer chooses d F ( z ) and knows that the decoder knows 8. The communicator chooses d G ( 8 ) and, further, the decoder knows 8 .
In this case we make a "compatibility" assumption, that is, for every 8 and d F ( z ) the capacity-achieving input Theorem 4: For the game described in Case AI, there exists a conservative strategy (dG( e), d p ( x ) ) for the communicator and a conservative strategy d F ( z ) for the jamdistribution d P ( x ) remains the same.
While "compatibility" certainly restricts our model applicability, we show by example that it is often a worst-case assumption. For instance, we know 191 that if M = L and if the jammer's strategy set is restricted so that for each distribution d F ( z ) and quantizer 8, Pr (errorlx} I z for every x, then the saddle-point strategy for the jammer is to choose a distribution such that and and the saddle-point strategy for the communicator is to choose a uniform distribution on the input alphabet. In our model this corresponds to choosing the canonical noise variables so that p ( ylx, 8 ) is a symmetric channel for each 8. Such symmetry (and thereby "compatibility") is obtained in a number of other situations as a saddle-point strategy. Under certain conditions, when we have convex constraints in the M noise variables affecting the M inputs of the channel which are invariant under any permutation of the M variables (i.e., a "symmetric" constraint), then the choice of a uniform distribution on the input and the choice of a symmetric channel are saddle-point strategies for the communicator and the jammer, respectively (see The main result is stated in the following theorem.
(dG*( e), dF*( z ) ) such that
E , ( c ( e , F * ) ) I EG.(c(e, F*)) I E,,(c(e, F ) )
is clearly convex and compact. The set of all dG's is also convex and compact.
We note that for any fixed dF( z ) , C(8, F ) is a continuous function of 8:
is by our earlier arguments a continuous function of 8.
Hence !,,,(e) is a continuous function of 8. Also C(8, F ) = C(Pylx(8)), and we know that C(PyI,(8)) is convex in Py,,( 8 ) . Therefore, for every 8 E Q such that Pyl, (8) is not deterministic , C( P,,,,( 8) ) is a continuous function of Pyl,( 8). Hence for fixed dF(z), C( 8, F ) = C ( Py,,( 8 ) ) is a continuous function of 8 and so
is a Levy continuous functional of dG(8).
Since EG (C(8, F ) ) is linear in dG(8), it is also a concave function of dG(8). Next we note that
Hence c ( e , a F 1 + ( i -a ) F 2 )
Taking expectations with respect to G,
C ( 8 , a F ' + ( l -a ) F 2 ) d G ( 8 )

/e I /~a c ( e , F l ) + ( i -a ) c ( e , F 2 ) ) d c ( e ) .
Therefore, E,( c( e,& + (1 -a )~2 ) ) 
I a E G ( c ( e , F~) )
+ (I -a)E,(c(e, F~) ) .
Consequently, E,( C(8, F ) ) is a convex function in dF( z ) .
Also E, (C(8, F ) ) is Levy continuous in dF(z). To prove this, it suffices to show that for any sequence F, converging to F in the Levy metric
Since convergence in the Levy metric is in our case equivalent to weak convergence [13, appendix C], it suffices to show this for Fn S F. However,
for all feasible dG(8), dF(z), i.e., (dG*(8), dF*(z)) is a saddle-point for the game case AII.
(by the dominated convergence theorem)
The set of all feasible dF 's, i.e.,
which proves Levy continuity in dF(z). From these properties of the objective function and the convexity and compactness of the feasible strategy sets we recognize that the hypotheses of the Sion minimax theorem of game theory are satisfied [2, theorem 7, p. 2181. This concludes the proof of Theorem 3.
We note that these saddle-point distributions need not have finite support. However, in this case we have an equilibrium, and with no further knowledge of each other's choice of strategy, the jammer and the quantizer should be content utilizing dG*( 8) and dF*( z).
Using the optimization theorem and the constrained optimization theorem, we can derive necessary and sufficient conditions at these saddle points. Given any d G ( 8 ) and the power constraint, we define
where 9 is the space of distributions on Q. Then we have the following.
Theorem 6: The saddle-point strategies dF*, dG* satisfy the following inequalities:
EG.( /( -I( z ; 8 , F*)-A f ( z ) ) d F ( z ) )
I E~* ( -c(e, F*)) -AK, (29) for some A 2 0, for all F where t x z ; 8, F ) i i c P ( X ) P ( Y l X , z , 6)
for all G.
Proof: For any F, denote by DGo(EG (C(8, F ) ) ) the weak derivative of EG (C(8, F ) ) at Go, and for any G denote by D,,,(E, (C(O, F ) ) ) the weak derivative of EG (C(8, F ) ) at F,. Using Lemma 3 and the dominated convergence theorem, we have -i ( z ; 8 , F 1 ) d F 2 + E G ( C ( 8 , F l ) ) (31)
&,@c(-C(87F2))
= E G
( 1 for any F,, F2. Also
D,I(E,2(c(8? 0 ) = E G 2 ( C ( 6 a-EG1(C(8, F ) ) .
Now letting F, = F*,G,=G* in (32) and using the constrained optimization theorem and the optimization theorem and the properties of EG( C( 8, F ) ) as in Theorem 2, we have that a necessary and sufficient condition for F* to achieve U,( K,, G*) is
E. . ( -J ( i ( z ; B , P ) -A f ( z ) ) d F ( z ) )
for some A 2 0, for all F. Letting F, = F*, G, = G* in the second equation gives us similarly that a necessary and sufficient condition to achieve E,( F*) is for all G. Since at a saddle-point R (K,,G*) and F.(F*) are simultaneously achleved, the theorem follows.
EG(C(@, F*)) 5 EG*(C(@, F*))
(34)
A . The Remaining Cases
Case BII: Theorem 3 holds with F ( z ) as a one-dimensional distribution.
Case CII: Although S is compact, it is not convex and so we cannot demonstrate that there is a saddle-point strategy.
Case DII: Again,
we have that E,(C(B, F ) ) is a Levycontinuous functional of d G ( 8 ) and is concave in dG(8).
Also EG (C(8, F ) ) is Levy continuous in (dF1(z) ; . ., dFD(z)). However, EG(C (8, F,; . ., FD)) is not convex in (F,; . e , FD). Hence we cannot assert the existence of a saddle point in this case.
B. Fixed Quantizer
Before concluding this section we also point out that if we did not have randomized quantization, then without "compatibility" the game would have a saddle point where the jammer's saddle-point distribution need be concentrated at at most M ( L -1) + 2 points. We summarize this in Theorem 7. The second term in (41) can also clearly be made I z for sufficiently large n. Thus the continuity of I(8, P , F ) with respect to P is confirmed, and the first part of the theorem follows. The bound on the number of points of support of dF* follows from Theorem la). The necessary and sufficient conditions are derived as before from Theorem 3 and well-known results on channel capacity [13, p. 911.
V. CONCLUSION
We have constructed fairly general channel models which are capable of representing a number of jamming situations. The jammers we have considered have all been nonadaptive, and by using results from the compound channel, we were able to give operational significance to our minimax performance measures, i.e., we asserted the existence of encoders and decoders that can perform at arbitrarily low probabilities of error at rates close to our performance measures. Our analysis is clearly also applicable to many restrictions on the jammer's strategy set other than the ones we have considered.
In the case where the decoder is uninformed (Case I) we have shown that the worst-case jammer strategy (as well as best communicator strategy) need only be one of the class of distributions with finite support. We have a bound on the number of these points of support in terms of the sizes of the input and the output alphabet. Thus we have reduced the computation of the worst-case jamming strategies to a finite-dimensional nonlinear programming problem. Moreover we can characterize these distributions by necessary and sufficient conditions that are fairly easy to test.
In cases where the decoder is informed, we reduce the communicator's strategy set (either by using the "compatibility" assumption or by fixing a quantizer). In such instances, when we have convexity with respect to the jammer's strategy (as in cases AI1 and BII), we were able to demonstrate the existence of a saddle-point strategy. For the case of nonrandomized quantization we were further able to characterize these saddle-point strategies.
We reiterate that all the above presupposes nonadaptive jamming. The compound channel model which we use ate in this case. We can allow for more sophisticated strategies are allowed to depend on the previous (and present) channel inputs. The appropriate channel model to use then is that of the arbitrarily "star" varying channel ( A * V C ) [8, p. 2331 
. loe and b) for the jammer
which is the same objective function as the one we have used. Similarly, in the case where the decoder is informed we would obtain the same objective functions. Thus all the results derived in the previous chapter for the case of mutual information can be extended to the case of the A*VC channel with binary output. This model may be viewed as a worst-case representation of adaptive jamming. Unfortunately, the rn-capacity of the A VC is as yet unknown for output sizes greater than 2. On the other hand, the a-capacity of the AVC (i.e., the capacity with average probability of error) is known to be either 0 or else necessary and sufficient computable condition is given for determining if the capacity is positive.) Since in our model the set of channels is convex as well as row-convex, the a-capacity is known to be greater than 0 if and only if the m-capacity is greater than 0 [l]. Thus with average probability of error, whenever the jammer's strategy set is such that he cannot force the capacity to be 0, then all the results of the preceding chapter extend to the case of the A*VC channel. By choosing a sequence a,, $0 and using weak convergence of 
APPENDIX I
APPENDIX I1
Here we consider a communication game with two players, player A who chooses an input distribution r on the M-ary input alphabet, and player B who chooses the M x L transition probability matrix. Let X and Y denote the input and output random variables, respectively, and let n, denote the distribution of the random variable associated with the conditional density p ( ylx,). Let the set of all feasible ii's ( = ( n , ; . ., n M ) ) be compact. The channel p ( y l x ) is a function of ii ( = ( n , ; . ., n M ) ) . Assume that function is linear and that for a choice of n, = n, i = 1,. . . , M the channel chosen is symmetric. Let I ( r , i i ) 2 I( X; Y ) when A's choice is r and B's choice is si. Let n,; . ., n M be constrained by f , ( n , ; . . , n , ) I c , , i = l ; . . , c , where f, is a convex symmetric function of n , ; . ., n M , i.e., f, is invariant under any permutation of n,; . ., n M . Then a saddle-point strategy exists for both players. For player A it is to choose a uniform distribution on the input. For player B it is to choose all the components of ii equal; that is, there exists ii* with all its components equal such that I( r , E*) 5 I( r*, ii*) I I( r*, E ) where r* corresponds to the uniform input distribution.
Proof:
Step 1: I ( r , E*) I I(r*, E*). This follows from the fact that the mutual information between the input and the output of a symmetric channel is maximized by the uniform distribution.
Step 2: I( r*, E*) I I(r*, ii). Since I( X, Y ) is a convex function of p ( y l x ) , which is linear in ii, I ( r , i i ) is convex in si. Moreover, given the form of the constraints, the set of feasible ii's is a convex set. Now for any E > 0, let inf I(r*, 2 ) + E be achieved at some ii, # ii*. Then we show I(r*, ii*) I I ( r * , SI), proving that the minimum is also achieved at E*. The use of a uniform distribution on the input and the symmetry of the constraints implies that for any permutation of ii,(ii," say) we have a new channel p*(ylx) which involves just a relabeling of the inputs of the original channel. The mutual information I ( r * , i i l ) is equal to I( r*, E,"). Now consider all the M ! permutations of ii, = si,": a E T (not all the permutations are distinct, but this does not matter). Take the convex combination l / M ! X a E = ii, (say). Every component of si, is equal to l / M ! X~n , , .
Also from the convexity of I ( r * , ii) w.r.t. ii we know that Therefore, I( r*, ii,) I I( r*, El) and hence inf I( r*, ii) + E is achieved at ii, too. The result follows from the observation that I(r*, i i ) is concave in r.
APPENDIX I11
We append here a collection of results (without proof) on the Levy metric and topology which are utilized in various parts of the paper. The proofs may all be found in With F and F,, F2 , . . . denoting distribution func-= (XI, X2; . ., X,) such that t, I
Theorem:
-+ F at every point X which is a continuity point of the tions of the random vector X, I U,, the following are equivalent: 1) distribution F( X);
